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Taxing Systemic Risk
ERIC D. CHASON *
ABSTRACT
A tax on the harmful elements of finance—a tax on systemic risk—would
raise revenue and also lower the likelihood of future crisis. Financial
institutions, which pay the tax, would try to minimize its cost by lowering their
systemic risk. In theory, a tax on systemic risk is perfect policy. In practice,
however, this perfect policy is unattainable. Tax laws need clear definitions
to be administrable. Our current understanding of systemic risk is too abstract
and too metaphorical to serve as a target for taxation.
Despite the absence of a clear definition of systemic risk, academics and
policy makers continue to propose special taxes on finance. The most
prominent proposal is the financial transaction tax (FTT), which has some
possibility of being adopted in the European Union. The FTT and other
similar proposals levy their taxes on proxies for systemic risk (for example,
the volume of financial transactions or the size of financial institutions). While
these proposals would raise revenue, they would fail as regulatory measures
(and could even be counterproductive). While transaction volume and
institutional size might be correlated with systemic risk, they are not causes of
systemic risk. By exploring each of these issues in depth, this article provides
a useful starting point for the discussion on taxing the financial sector.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the passage of time and reform legislation 1 since the end of the
financial crisis, policymakers and commentators still worry about the risks that
remain in the financial sector. At the same time, governments in both Europe
and the United States face deep budget deficits, caused in part by the financial
crisis and ensuing economic dislocations. Special taxes on the financial sector
seem to address both concerns. They would certainly raise revenue. And, if
they targeted risky practices and transactions, special taxes could even reduce
the risk of future financial crisis.2
The most prominent proposal is the financial transactions tax of the
European Union. 3 The tax would apply a low rate to the value of all financial
transactions, similar in operation to taxes on retail and real-estate sales.

1
Cf. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012))
(purporting to “promote the financial stability of the United States” among other
purposes).
2
See generally Daniel N. Shaviro, The Financial Transactions Tax vs. the
Financial Activities Tax, 66 TAX NOTES INT’L 661, 661–62 (May 14, 2012).
3
See infra Part III.
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Economist James Tobin proposed a similar tax on currency transactions in the
1970s, hoping to stabilize the turbulent flows of currencies that then plagued
cross-border finance. 4 Modern supporters claim that the tax would stabilize
markets, diminish an overly powerful financial sector, and add much needed
revenue to depleted public coffers. 5 As of late March 2017, the financial
transactions tax faces uncertain prospects for passage. 6
While motives of revenue (and perhaps revenge) support the tax, some
view a tax on finance as having a regulatory purpose. 7 The failure or distress
of banks can harm the economy at large, not just investors and others who are
directly connected to the bank. Such harm is an externality justifying
regulation and corrective taxes. 8 Taxes on other externalities, particularly
pollution, enjoy considerable support. 9 Taxing pollution not only curtails
pollution but gives polluters the flexibility on how to cut their emissions most
cost effectively. Theoretically, policymakers could regulate finance solely by
taxing third third-party effects.
The practical difficulties of corrective taxation, though, are daunting.
Recall the problem just mentioned: failure or distress in the financial sector
harms third parties. A tax on bad outcomes would apply to a firm already in
distress or insolvency. Such a tax would be useless or even counterproductive,
worsening the very distress that the tax should avoid. To be effective, a
regulatory tax on finance must apply to activities that increase the risk of bad
outcomes at financial institutions. In other words, the tax must apply to

4

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
6
See infra Part IV.
7
Contributions include Douglas A. Shackelford, Daniel Shaviro & Joel B.
Slemrod, Taxation and the Financial Sector, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 781 (2010); Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation: Carbon Tax, Health Care Tax, Bank Tax and
Other Regulatory Taxes (Univ. of Mich. Pub. L. Working Paper No. 216, 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1664045
[https://perma.cc/F9ED-7T66];
Narayana
Kocherlakota, Taxing Risk and the Optimal Regulation of Financial Institutions (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Econ. Policy Paper 10-3, 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616810 [https://perma.cc/9F6Z-DFTQ]; Beatrice Weder di
Mauro, Taxing Systemic Risk: Proposal for a Systemic Risk Levy and a Systemic Risk
Fund (Univ. of Mainz and Ger. Council of Econ. Experts, Jan. 25, 2010).
8
See Lee A. Sheppard & Martin A. Sullivan, Taxing Financial Pollution, 126
TAX NOTES 697, 699 (Feb. 8, 2010).
9
Editorial, Externalities: The Lives of Others, ECONOMIST (Aug. 19, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/news/economics-brief/21726709-what-do-wheninterests-individuals-and-society-do-not-coincide-fourth
[https://perma.cc/8V4Q53G2].
5
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“systemic risk.” This Article argues that mainstream proposals, like financial
transactions tax, fail to do so. 10
Real-world taxes require crisp definitions, but crisply defining systemic
risk is hard, even for the lords of finance. 11 Part II starts abstractly, proposing
to define systemic risk in terms of the social cost of firm failure or distress. 12
Losses borne directly by stakeholders (shareholders, creditors, or even
employees) should not qualify as systemic risk, unless those losses spill over
to the public at large. Employees and investors at Goldman Sachs deserve no
more special treatment than their counterparts at a bankrupt company like
Blockbuster Video. The rest of us, though, might suffer a lot more from
Goldman’s demise than Blockbuster’s. Conceptually, then, systemic risk
includes two aspects: (1) the likelihood of firm financial distress occurring and
(2) the impact financial distress would have upon non-stakeholders.
Part III describes how a corrective tax on finance should work. 13 It first
looks to familiar arguments in favor of taxing externalities in general, and
environmental pollution in particular. Policymakers might control pollution
by either limiting or taxing emissions. Both methods could limit pollution.
Only taxation, though, produces public revenue, and it also gives firms the
incentive to reduce outputs in the most cost-effective manner. In effect, the
government supplies a price at which it sells the right to emit a unit of
pollution. The free market takes care of the rest. Extending this model to
systemic risk sounds attractive in theory. In practice, though, the government
must draft legislation that defines the tax base. An environmental tax might
apply to a metric ton of carbon output. An income tax applies to a dollar of
income. A systemic-risk tax would apply to some measure of systemic risk or
a robust proxy. We must define it in a concrete, measurable way. The
conceptual definition of systemic risk previously described in Part II does not
go far enough.
Parts IV through VI 14 examine three prominent proposals to tax finance,
asking whether they adequately define and measure systemic risk. None of
the proposals appear focused on reducing systemic risk. The financial
transactions tax, discussed in Part IV, taxes every unit of currency (dollar,
euro, pound, etc.) involved in a financial transaction. But there is no reason to
think that a unit of currency involved in a financial transaction causes systemic
risk. The Article makes similar observations about two other proposals: the

10

See infra Part IV.
See Editorial, The Diviner of Systemic Risk, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2010, at A14
(describing difficulties of Ben Bernanke and Tim Geithner in defining systemic risk).
12
See infra Part II.
13
See infra Part III.
14
See infra Parts IV–VI.
11
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financial activities tax (favored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF))
and taxes on financial leverage (favored by the Obama administration).
As Part VII 15 notes in conclusion, these failures are in execution, not in
theory. Better measures of systemic risk could well result in a successful
corrective tax on finance.

I. SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE GOAL OF FINANCIAL REGULATION
A. Introduction
Legal scholars often describe systemic risk metaphorically as a shock
spreading from firm to firm and into the larger economy via a chain reaction.
In his 2008 article entitled Systemic Risk, Steven Schwarcz defines systemic
risk as:
[T]he risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or
institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise)
either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or
(Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii)
resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its
availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market
price volatility. 16
Similarly, Hal Scott contends:
Systemic risk has two distinct meanings. First, it refers to a
financial shock that has a simultaneous impact on a number
of financial institutions. Second, it refers to the chain reaction
problem, the possibility that the failure of one bank will affect
other banks. To some extent, these two versions are
interrelated; a major shock can trigger a chain reaction.17
The metaphors of “shock” and “chain reactions” may well convey the
essence of the problem. Financial firms are interconnected and important to
the overall economy. Failure of one financial firm threatens the entire
economy in unique ways. Many argue that losses at one firm not only spread
throughout the system but amplify as they spread. 18

15
16
17
18

See infra Part VI.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008).
HALL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 173 (16th ed. 2009).
Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 213–14.
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These metaphors may also help justify regulating, and taxing, financial
firms as a way to avoid the shocks and chain reactions. 19 But the design of a
corrective tax would need to account for more than metaphor. Traditional tax
bases—like income, sales, and wealth—can be reduced to numerical values.
Ideas like “shocks” and “chain reactions” cannot. The rest of this Part seeks
greater clarity in defining systemic risk.
B. Financial Intermediation
1. Mismatch between Short-Term Financing and Long-Term Investing
To understand systemic risk, we must understand what banks and other
financial institutions actually do. Your bank may call you a “customer” (or, if
you are rich enough, a “client”), but you and your deposits are really a source
of financing for the bank’s investments. The classic use of bank funds is to
make loans to homebuyers and businesses. Readers might remember George
Bailey standing down his panicked and homespun depositors in It’s a
Wonderful Life: “[Y]ou’re thinking of this place all wrong. As if I had the
money back in a safe. The money’s not here. Well, your money’s in Joe’s
house . . . that’s right next to yours. And in the Kennedy house, and Mrs.
Macklin’s house, and . . . a hundred others.” 20
Of course, businesses and individuals throughout the economy borrow to
finance their investments. What makes banks unique, however, is that they
typically invest in long-term, illiquid investments but finance with short-term,
liquid liabilities.21 The bank may invest in Mrs. Macklin’s and Joe’s
mortgages, but the bank cannot demand immediate repayment, nor can it easily
sell those mortgages in a market. In contrast, the bank receives its funds (i.e.,
finances its investments) from depositors who may demand repayment on a
moment’s notice. The assets (mortgage claims against borrowers) and
liabilities (deposits held for depositors) are mismatched.
The important service that Bailey and other banks provide is financial
intermediation. 22 Mrs. Macklin wants a 30-year mortgage. Her neighbors
want a safe but accessible place to put their money. Bailey takes in short-term
deposits and channels the funds to long-term borrowers. Doing so lets the

19

Id. at 232.
It’s
a
Wonderful
Life,
Script,
http://www.script-orama.com/movie_scripts/i/its-a-wonderful-life-script.html [https://perma.cc/DNC2ZXPK].
21
See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 37 (4th ed. 2009).
22
See generally Daniel A. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank
Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 306–07 (1987).
20
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depositors diversify across lots of mortgages and business loans (not just Mrs.
Macklin’s). Bailey’s problem was that his depositors all showed up at once
demanding to be paid. 23
2. Modern Variants on Bank Loans
Modern banks still lend Mrs. Macklin money. But rather than holding her
mortgage indefinitely, they likely “originate to distribute.”24 A bank pools
thousands of mortgages into a single portfolio, which is then sliced (tranched)
into marketable securities for resale to investors. Different tranches have
different priorities of repayment, with the senior tranche being repaid first, the
equity tranche last, and the mezzanine tranche in between. 25 The allure of
tranching comes from the ability to place a high (e.g., AAA) credit rating on
the senior tranche, making it marketable to conservative and regulated
investors. Mezzanine tranches carry a lower, less marketable credit rating
(e.g., BBB), while equity tranches are not rated at all. Creating “high quality”
tranches is so alluring that banks reiterated the process, pooling the mezzanine
tranches themselves into a new portfolio, which is itself then tranched into
collaterized debt obligations (CDOs) of senior, mezzanine, and equity
tranches. 26
Despite this process of securitization, much of the risks remained within
the banking system, as banks were some of the largest buyers of CDOs and
similar products. 27 When real estate prices fell and borrowers began to default,
banks could not exit these risks because no one else wanted to buy CDOs.
Even senior tranches looked like toxic waste, not conservative investments.
Banks discovered, at that time, that they had not successfully converted Mrs.
Macklin’s long-term, illiquid mortgage into a liquid security.
3. Modern Variants on Bank Deposits
Much as modern banking shifted from Mrs. Macklin’s mortgage to CDOs,
it has also turned to new sources of financing. Modern banks still finance with
traditional deposits, but they also raise funds through so-called shadow

23

See infra Sections I.C and I.D (describing how bank runs can destabilize the
economy and how governments try to control them).
24
See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE
UNITED STATES 447 (2011).
25
See id. at 43.
26
See id. at 71–72.
27
See JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 189 (8th ed.
2011).
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banking. For example, repurchase agreements or “repo” allow banks to raise
funds cheaply and quickly without the bother of obtaining a bank loan, issuing
securities, or taking in deposits. 28 Repo is secured lending: the lender buys an
asset from the borrower, on the condition that the borrower buy it back at a
slightly higher price in the future. The term is very short, and the buyback date
is often the very next day. 29 Repo lenders might be other financial institutions
and, indirectly, retail investors. Money-market funds take in contributions
from a wide array of investors (including individuals of modest means) and
invest them in short-term, liquid debt instruments like repo. 30 Money-market
funds and deposits are regulated differently but function similarly, both giving
short-term investors an accessible place to park their money while giving
borrowers a source of financing.
Banks and other financial firms came to rely heavily on repo borrowing to
finance their investments in the years leading up to the crisis. 31 Because they
are not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
however, repo lenders have far more incentive to react to bank distress than
depositors. Ordinarily, banks can rely on repo lenders to roll over their
expiring loans or find new ones on the market. During times of distress,
however, repo lenders can walk away with their money at any time, which has
the same effect as withdrawing a bank deposit. One prominent account of the
financial crisis calls it a “run on repo,” 32 in which losses in the subprime
market caused repo lenders to demand greater or higher quality collateral or
simply to exit the market altogether. Just as in a bank run, the bank does not
have enough liquidity on hand to pay the borrowers. 33 At the height of the
financial crisis, the Treasury Department took the extraordinary step of
guaranteeing money-market funds much like the FDIC guarantees deposits.34

28

Commercial paper is another form of short-term borrowing included in the
shadow-banking system. See generally id. at 787.
29
See id. at 76.
30
Id.
31
See Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on
Repo 1 (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 09-14, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440752
[https://perma.cc/V7LE-J5G3].
32
Id.
33
The lenders may themselves be retail investors who have bought shares of
money-market mutual funds. The funds act as conduits, taking in “deposits” from
investors and using them to buy repo or other short-term assets from borrowers. See
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 24, at 30.
34
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Temporary
Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 29, 2008),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1161.aspx
[https://perma.cc/YUL6-KDEM].
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C. The Fire-Sale Externality and Systemic Risk
The prior Section shows why financial institutions tend to be unstable.
They take in funds from short-term borrowers (deposits, repo) and deploy
those funds in illiquid investments (Mrs. Macklin’s mortgage, CDOs). If
borrowers all want repayment at once, the bank may not be able to pay and
could fail. So far, though, this account simply describes what might happen at
a particular firm. Why should failure at a bank be a matter of public concern?
Moreover, a bank run causes illiquidity not insolvency. The fact that George
Bailey’s depositors all want their money does not directly make Mrs.
Macklin’s loan worth less. Similarly, the fact that repo lenders withdraw from
the market en masse does not make illiquid CDOs 35 worth less.
This Section describes how firm-level distress can spread throughout the
economy. The prevailing view is that excessive risk taking at financial
institutions substantially contributed to the recent crisis. 36 We need, however,
some idea of what makes some risk taking “excessive,” 37 why self-serving
firms would subject themselves to it, and why it would actually affect anyone
unconnected to the firm.
A bank facing a run (either by deposits or by repo lenders) needs cash. If
the bank does not have enough cash on hand and cannot raise more through
new deposits, repo, or the like, it will need to sell its stake in its illiquid
investments: Mrs. Macklin’s mortgage, the CDOs, etc. During a panic,
however, several banks are looking to sell and few are looking to buy. Banks
thus need to accept a lower value for the asset. But doing so forces the bank
to revalue all similar assets it holds, even if it is not selling. The distressed
sale affects the banks entire balance sheet. 38

35

See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing CDOs).
See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 24, at xix (“We conclude a
combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency put
the financial system on a collision course with crisis.”).
37
Cf. Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 1 (2009), (statement of Kevin J. Murphy) (“Political pressures
to reform pay have escalated in spite of limited evidence that compensation structures
have, in fact, been responsible for excessive risk taking in the financial services
industry. Indeed, the pressures have emerged even without a definition of ‘excessive
risk taking’ or how we might distinguish excessive risk from the normal risks.”).
38
The analysis that follows relies heavily on Markus K. Brunnermeier,
Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES
77 (2009). The Article enjoyed fame that few academics dream of when Fed Chair
Ben Bernanke recommended it (along with two other articles and one book) for those
trying to understand the financial crisis. See Michael Corkery, Ben Bernanke’s Labor
Day Reading List, WALL ST. J.: DEAL J. (Sept. 2, 2010, 4:18 PM),
36
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To see why, suppose that a bank has assets valued at $100 billion, derived
from repo lending of $90 billion and equity of $10 billion. All of the assets
are invested in CDOs. Now, suppose that 10% of the bank’s repo lenders
(holding $9 billion of claims) fear losses on the bank’s investments in CDOs
and refuse to roll over their repo. No one else is willing to supply new funds.
The bank needs $9 billion of cash to repay these lenders.
Repayment is no problem if the bank can simply sell CDOs at book
value. 39 But, recall that the market is concerned about the bank, so the bank
might need to accept a lower price. Perhaps the bank needs to sell 10% of its
portfolio—previously thought to have been worth $10 billion but saleable for
only $9 billion. Initially, this discount might not look so bad if the bank is
merely taking a $1 billion loss, which can be absorbed by its $10 billion of
equity. After the sale, it has CDOs of $90 billion and cash of $9 billion, right?
Perhaps not, because the discount sale may cause us to reexamine the
entire value of the bank. The bank is selling some of its CDOs at a 10%
discount. Arguably, we should discount all of its holdings by that much. If
so, it now has CDOs discounted to $81 billion and cash worth $9 billion.
Because it still has liabilities of $90 billion, its entire equity is wiped out,
putting it on the edge of insolvency. News of the bank’s distress panics its
remaining lenders, who themselves seek to withdraw their funds (e.g., by
declining to roll over their repo). The second wave of discounts throws the
bank into insolvency.
This vicious cycle is the “run on repo” mentioned above. 40 The cycle
endangers other banks as well, who may be holding similar CDOs financed by
similarly panicked depositors and repo lenders. Discounted selling by one
bank forces other banks to discount their holdings, making them appear less
healthy. Because the discounted selling affects other banks, it has been termed
the “fire-sale externality.” 41 We usually expect lower prices to attract bargain
hunters, driving up demand and stabilizing prices. But depositors, repo
lenders, and other banks are all looking to get out of the market. Without
buyers, a “liquidity spiral” takes hold, making banking structures less stable
and self-correcting than most economic activities. 42
The liquidity spiral does not directly affect bank borrowers like Mrs.
Macklin. She is unlikely to know or care if her mortgage has been sliced up
and sold several times over. Yet, her 25-year-old daughter, Miranda, might

http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/09/02/ben-bernankes-labor-day-reading-list/
[https://perma.cc/TX2Z-CDVE].
39
The bank’s balance sheet would have $91 billion of assets, $81 billion of
deposits/repo, and $10 billion of equity.
40
See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 31.
41
See Brunnermeier, supra note 38.
42
See id.
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not be able to find a loan for her new house. Or, her law-firm employer might
need to lay her off as tighter credit conditions drive down economic activity
and the demand for legal services. Instability, distress, and failure in banking
can spread, inflicting costs upon society at large, not just the shareholders,
depositors, and other stakeholders of a firm. 43 This characteristic, known as
systemic risk, 44 explains how perhaps $1 trillion of subprime mortgage losses
translated into an $8 trillion decline in the U.S. stock market and the worst
economic crisis since the Great Depression. 45
In light of these costs, this Article will treat systemic risk as an
externality 46 that justifies regulation. 47 A bank that poses systemic risk enjoys
the full upside of its risk taking but is shielded from much of the downside.
This asymmetry is far more pronounced in a bank than in a typical limited
liability firm like a corporation.48 It is true that corporate shareholders, in all
industries, enjoy the full upside of their risk taking while exposing their
creditors to some of the downside. However, corporate creditors are (for the
most part) voluntary and screen their debtors for excessive risk taking.
Corporate debtors who take on additional risk must pay for the privilege with
higher interest rates. In contrast, systemic risk burdens society at large.
Absent regulation, society has no way of imposing higher costs on firms that
engage in activities that produce more systemic risk.

43

See Schwarcz, supra note 16 at 206 (describing systemic risk as an externality).
See infra Part I.A.
45
Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion:
Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis, 124 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 1449
(2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1072304 [https://perma.cc/BA3D-5ZNF].
46
Cf. ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 352 (1995) (“An
externality is present whenever the well-being of a consumer or the production
possibilities of a firm are directly affected by the actions of another agent in the
economy.”); DOUGLAS BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 307 (1998) (“An
externality exists whenever a person does not enjoy all the benefits or incur all the
costs that result from the actions that person undertakes.”).
47
One could similarly characterize systemic risk as a collective-action problem
of shareholders. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation and Corporate
Governance in Financial Firms: The Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay
(Columbia
L.
and
Econ.
Working
Paper
No.
373,
2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633906 [https://perma.cc/E8B7-L8H5].
48
See generally FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996).
44
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D. Micro- and Macro-Prudential Regulation
The traditional, and still dominant, form of financial regulation is “microprudential” in that it seeks stability at individual firms. 49 For example, suppose
(like in the prior Section), a large bank invests in CDOs. Before the bank’s
repo lenders become alarmed, regulators identify the CDOs as being
particularly risky. Forcing the bank to sell the CDOs would decrease the risk
of insolvency or distress at the bank.
Following the financial crisis, however, many commentators have
criticized the micro-prudential approach. 50 In the prior Section, we saw how
actions that stabilize one bank (selling risky CDOs) may destabilize the entire
financial system. Selling the risky CDOs in an illiquid market may be difficult,
and the seller may need to accept a discounted price. Other banks holding
similar CDOs may need to revalue their holdings to account for the loss,
making them appear less stable and making it harder for them to obtain
financing. Thus, by forcing one bank to sell its CDOs, regulators might make
the entire system less stable. In short, micro-prudential regulation may
stabilize one firm but destabilize the entire system.
Proposals for “macro-prudential” regulation would focus on such systemwide effects. A macro-prudential approach would tighten during boom
markets when the system could most easily accommodate the side effects.
During busts, regulation would ease. To date, macro-prudential regulation is
still in the development phase. For example, some contend that the capital
adequacy rules (discussed below) 51 could be strengthened during booms and
relaxed during busts. 52
Along these lines, some argue that a financial transactions tax could
dampen the boom/bust cycle. According to them, the tax could thwart the
formation of financial bubbles by making trading more expensive. 53 However,
the recent financial crisis was sparked by a bubble in the U.S. housing
market. 54 Transactions taxes (on sales and deed recordations) already exist in

49

See generally CARNELL ET AL., supra note 21 (providing overviews of firmlevel banking and financial regulation).
50
See, e.g., Piet Clement, The Term “Macroprudential”: Origins and Evolution,
BIS Q. REV., Mar. 1, 2010, at 59.
51
See infra Part I.E.2.
52
See generally Avinash Persaud, Macro-Prudential Regulation (2009),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/337731468161952385/pdf/503470BRI0
Box31ponse0Note601PUBLIC1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MNG7-82EE].
53
See, e.g., Thornton Matheson, Taxing Financial Transactions: Issues and
Evidence 21 (IMF Working Paper WP/11/54, Mar. 2011).
54
Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the
Resulting Credit Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120, 120 (2009)
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this market and failed to prevent the crisis. Similarly, a recurring problem of
bank runs is that markets become illiquid. Banks cannot find buyers for their
illiquid investments, and transactions taxes would seem to make it even harder
to sell at the margin.
In short, the micro-prudential approach still dominates financial
regulation, and corrective taxes have no obvious macro-prudential benefits.
As a result, this Article will limit its analysis to the micro-prudential effects of
corrective taxes on finance. To develop this analysis, the next Section
summarizes the existing system of (largely micro-prudential) regulation in the
United States.
E. Financial Regulation
Section C suggested that systemic risk is a type of externality for firms.
Firms certainly suffer from financial distress, but banking is unique in that
distress not only spreads but amplifies through the rest of the economy. Thus,
it is possible that banks would take risks that are privately optimal (even if they
turn out badly for the banks) but socially destructive. In order to control these
risks, governments not only regulate banks but also support them in times of
distress.
Outside the financial sector, preventing default or insolvency is usually
not a matter of public concern. 55 The failure of a firm certainly causes
hardships for employees, suppliers, and investors, but such “creative
destruction” is usually tolerated, sometimes even welcomed, as an essential
part of economic growth. 56 Poorly run firms should fail and release their
resources for better run firms to use. For banks and other financial firms,

(“The general consensus is that the primary cause of the current recession was the
credit crisis arising from the bursting of the housing bubble.”).
55
That is not to say that the government never intervenes to protect failing,
nonfinancial firms. Most recently and perhaps famously, the U.S. Treasury assisted
General Motors and Chrysler with its Automotive Industry Financing Program. See
generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-151, TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM: CONTINUED STEWARDSHIP NEEDED AS TREASURY DEVELOPS
STRATEGIES FOR MONITORING AND DIVESTING FINANCIAL INTERESTS IN CHRYSLER
AND GM (2009). Later, in 2009, the government would provide additional funding to
General Motors and Chrysler through unorthodox and controversial bankruptcy
proceedings. Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing The Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108
MICH. L. REV. 727, 728 (2010).
56
The phrase “creative destruction” is associated with the Austrian economist
Joseph Schumpeter and his most famous work, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY (1942).
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however, destruction is often just destructive. Few today would heed the
economic recovery plan that Herbert Hoover attributed to Andrew Mellon:
“Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers,
liquidate real estate.” [Mellon] insisted that, when the people
get an inflation brainstorm, the only way to get it out of their
blood is to let it collapse. He held that even a panic was not
altogether a bad thing. He said: “It will purge the rottenness
out of the system. High costs of living and high living will
come down. People will work harder, live a more moral life.
Values will be adjusted, and enterprising people will pick up
the wrecks from less competent people.” 57
As described above, bank and financial failures are particularly disruptive
to the larger economy.
1. Bank Activities
Governments have long regulated the types of activities that banks can
undertake. The Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act 58 divorced commercial
banking (i.e., taking customer deposits) from investment banking (i.e., acting
as broker, dealer or underwriter for securities) but had been repealed by the
end of the twentieth century. 59 Glass-Steagall had several rationales, one of
which was to protect the banking system from the risks inherent in the stock

57

HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE GREAT
DEPRESSION, 1929-1941 (1952).
58
The U.S. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat.
162, 184–85, 188–89, 194 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
59
The Glass-Steagall provisions were sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Banking
Act of 1933. See Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the
Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 1 n.1 (1987).
Sections 16 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012)) and 21 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 378 (2012)) remain in force, preventing the same corporate
entity from acting as both investment and commercial bank. Sections 20 and 32
prevented investment and commercial banks from coming under common control
(either by corporate structure or by interlocking directors, officers, or employees).
These provisions were formally repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 103, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999), although prior
regulatory and judicial interpretations had largely eviscerated them. See Jonathan R.
Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 25 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 691, 691–92 (2000).
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market. 60 Today, banks that accept deposits cannot directly engage in
investment banking, but they can indirectly do so via non-bank affiliates.
The Dodd-Frank Act’s “Volcker rule,” 61 attempts to create a similar divide
between regulated banks and securities dealing by prohibiting banks from
engaging in proprietary trading on their own account (rather than for clients). 62
The Volcker rule is a high-profile slice of Dodd-Frank, which dramatically
expands the authority of financial regulators, especially over the large bank
holding companies that now dominate American finance. 63 Like GlassSteagall, the Volcker rule regulates the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet.
Because volatile assets are more likely to send a bank into insolvency than
placid ones, governments try to direct banks into less investment.
2. Capital Adequacy
Firm investments determine the amount of losses a firm might face. Banks
might suffer losses differently by investing in the stock market, mortgages, or
CDOs. Firm capital structure, however, determines how much loss a firm can
absorb before being distressed or insolvent. A firm funded 100% with
common equity could not become insolvent, whereas a firm funded 100% with
debt becomes insolvent with the slightest loss. As financial intermediaries,
banks naturally hold debt in their capital structure in the form of demand
deposits and other short-term obligations like repo.
To reduce the risk of distress or insolvency, regulators require banks to
hold a certain level of common equity and other “capital” on their balance
sheets. The actual rules for bank capital are incredibly complex 64 but present

60

See Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630–31 (1971).
The Volcker rule is named after former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker
who advocated for the rule. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY &
RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN
RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS & PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 1–2 (2010).
62
See Dodd-Frank § 619(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2012)); see
also id. § 619(h)(4) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4) (2012)) (defining proprietary
trading). The prohibition applies to a “banking entity,” which includes a depository
institution, its parent company, and affiliates. See id. § 619(h)(1) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1851(h)(1) (2012)).
63
See, e.g., Dodd-Frank § 114(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5325(a)(1) (2012))
(authorizing additional regulation for “large, interconnected bank holding
companies”).
64
See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A
GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING
SYSTEMS
(2010,
rev.
2011)
[hereinafter
BASEL
III,
CAPITAL]
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WPQ8-496W];
BASEL
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
61
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fairly straightforward issues. Regulators must define what qualifies as capital
and specify the amount a bank must carry. Common equity clearly qualifies,
and senior secured debt does not. Firms also finance with instruments having
characteristics of both debt and equity, like preferred stock and unsecured
debentures.
Capital structure alone, however, does not determine the risk of a default.
We must also know about the riskiness of the firm’s business. A firm with a
1-to-1 debt-to-equity ratio looks to have a safe capital structure, but if it is
pursuing a very risky business strategy, it could still face a high risk of default.
Similarly, a firm with a 9-to-1 debt-to-equity ratio might pursue a very safe,
low-risk business strategy that makes default unlikely. Thus, regulators need
a way to link the riskiness of the firm’s capital structure to the riskiness of its
activities. A series of agreements among central bankers from the developed
world, known as the Basel accords, provide regulators with a road map for
regulating bank capital. 65
The basic model of Basel is to require firms to have a certain amount of
“capital” in their financial structure; the amount is determined as a percentage
of “risk-weighted assets.” Under the current and prior accords, Basel I and II,
the requirement is that total capital equal at least 8% of risk-weighted assets. 66
Conceptually, capital is a structure that the Basel committee believed could
absorb losses, perhaps thought of as financial shock absorbers. The accords
divide capital into “tier 1” and “tier 2.” The main component of tier 1 capital
is common equity, although certain types of preferred stock and disclosed
accounting reserves count as well. 67 At least half of required capital must
come from tier 1. 68 The remainder may come from tier 2, a less restrictive set
including preferred stock and accounting provisions and reserves excluded
from tier 2. 69
The true complexity of Basel comes from determining a firm’s “riskweighted assets.” Different assets held by a firm receive different weight,
depending on the asset, the accord (Basel I or II), and the methodology
authorized by the accord. The following stylized example will hopefully
convey the gist of the Basel approach. A very low-risk asset (like government
bonds) might receive a 0% weight. As a result, a firm need not hold any capital

MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK COMPREHENSIVE
VERSION (2006) [hereinafter BASEL II] http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DH3U-2W77].
65
See BASEL III, CAPITAL, supra note 64; BASEL II, supra note 64; see also BASEL
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1988) [hereinafter BASEL I].
66
BASEL II, supra note 64, at 12; BASEL I, supra note 65, at 14.
67
See BASEL III, CAPITAL, supra note 64 at 13.
68
See supra note 66.
69
See BASEL II, supra note 64, at 14–18.
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against the bond. Riskier assets are assigned higher weights, up to and even
exceeding 100%. To use a simple example, a firm might hold two assets, both
with a value of $500 million, but one with a risk-weighting of 0% and the other
with a risk-weighting of 100%. The firm would then have total risk-weighted
assets of $500 million, against which the firm would need to hold capital of
8%, or $40 million. At least half, or $20 million, would need to come from
tier 1 capital.
Basel is an unusually successful example of cooperative international law.
The Basel Committee itself has no formal power, and the Basel accords are
not binding as treaties. Still, countries over the world have adopted some
version of Basel. Basel has not, however, been so brilliant in the intended goal
of controlling systemic risk. 70 All of the large investment and commercial
banks in the United States were subject to some version of Basel in 2008. 71
Moreover, the United States imposed an additional “leverage ratio” on its
commercial (but not investment banks), requiring them to holding at least 5%
of tier 1 capital against total assets. 72 This rule is simpler than Basel II, in that
assets are not weighted for risk.
In response to the financial crisis, the Basel committee agreed on a new
accord, “Basel III,” in September 2010. 73 Basel III has yet to be implemented
in the U.S., but will force banks to hold more tier 1 capital and common equity.
Common equity must be at least 4.5%, and tier 1 capital 6.0%, of risk-weighted
assets. 74 Systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) must hold even
more. Basel III also advances the concept of macro-prudential regulation by
requiring banks to increase their capital when credit markets are expanding. 75
3. Deposit Insurance
Federal deposit insurance not only protects depositors but also removes
their incentive to panic and make a run on their bank. Before the financial

70

See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE BASEL COMMITTEE’S
RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: REPORT TO THE G-20 10 (2010),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs179.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UDV-D5RF] .
71
DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANQUE DE FRANCE CONFERENCE, CAPITAL
REGULATION ACROSS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 8 (2015) (“Prior to the crisis, the
Basel regime—though nominally applicable only to internationally active banks—in
fact applied to most banks in many member jurisdictions, including the United States
and the European Union (EU).”).
72
See 12 C.F.R. § 325.103(b) (2017).
73
See BASEL III, CAPITAL, supra note 64.
74
Id. at 12.
75
See id. at 59.
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crisis, the FDIC protected account values up to $100,000. 76 In order to calm
depositors and prevent bank runs, the government increased this protection to
$250,000. 77 The Treasury department even temporarily guaranteed moneymarket mutual funds, 78 the supposedly uninsured mutual funds that invest in
repo and other short-term corporate obligations. 79
The FDIC charges premiums for its deposit insurance in order to offset
amounts it must pay out. 80 Protecting depositors, though, comes at a cost
beyond directly covering their losses. Depositors do not monitor their banks
to make sure they are conducting their business prudently. As a result, bank
managers and shareholders may be tempted to pursue risky projects that have
a large potential gain, even if potential losses make those projects imprudent
overall. The incentive to pursue risk is known as “moral hazard,” which is
thought to be the primary cost of deposit insurance and bailouts. 81
4. Discount Window and Other Lending Facilities
Banks face the risk of illiquidity because they borrow short-term funds
(e.g., deposits, repo) and invest in long-term projects (e.g., Mrs. Macklin’s
mortgage, structured finance projects). Thus, a perfectly solvent bank may not
have enough liquid funds to discharge its liabilities. Through its discount
window, the Federal Reserve (Fed) system acts as lender-of-last-resort and
makes short-term loans to banks facing liquidity strains. 82
During the crisis, many banks feared they would be stigmatized by
borrowing from the discount window, perversely making the discount window
a destabilizing force. 83 In December 2007, the Fed responded to this concern

76

Cf. Dodd-Frank § 335(a), 124 Stat. at 1540 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1821(a)(1)(E)(2012)) (replacing $100,000 limit with $250,000).
77
See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E). The FDIC fully insures non-interest-bearing
accounts through December 31, 2012. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012)
(amended by Dodd-Frank § 343(a), 124 Stat. at 1544).
78
See U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE
TREASURY’S TEMPORARY GUARANTEE PROGRAM FOR MONEY MARKET FUNDS
(2008),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1163.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3ELW-QVFZ].
79
Cf. Gorton & Metrick, supra note 31 (discussing the “run on repo”).
80
See Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 226.
81
See, e.g., id. at 209.
82
See THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 44–45 (9th ed.
2005),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TYM2-QHDK].
83
Before Dodd-Frank, the Federal Reserve did not publish the identity of
discount-window borrowers, although it did publish the volume of borrowing.
Nevertheless, banks feared that others could detect their discount-window borrowing
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by creating the Term Auction Facility (TAF), which came to dwarf the
discount window during the crisis. 84 Because TAF used a competitive bidding
process, banks perceived it as carrying less stigma than the discount window. 85
TAF was open only to depository institutions. 86 In order to supply
liquidity to other financial institutions, the Fed created a wide array of
extraordinary lending facilities and guarantee programs. 87 In December 2010,
the Fed revealed the details of many of these transactions, identifying
participants ranging from Goldman Sachs to Harley Davidson. 88
5. Bailouts
Afraid that default would further destabilize the financial system, the U.S.
government deployed massive funds to keep bank creditors whole, while
letting shareholders suffer, to curtail moral hazard. When the New York Fed
brokered a deal for JPMorgan to buy Bear Stearns, government officials
initially urged a lower price than JPMorgan was willing to pay. 89 And, when
it put Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in government conservatorship, it largely
squeezed out the interests of their shareholders (including Ralph Nader, who
has taken his grievances to the readership of the Wall Street Journal). 90

by analyzing private borrowing patterns and the published volume of borrowing. See
Renee Courtois Haltom, Stigma and the Discount Window, REGION FOCUS:
RICHMOND FED. RES., First Quarter 2011, at 6.
84
See id. at 7–8.
85
Indeed, banks paid higher rates using TAF than they could at the discount
window. See id. at 8; see also Olivier Armantier et al., The Federal Reserve’s Term
Auction Facility, 14 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.: CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. AND FIN., no.
5, 2008, at 6 (describing the decreased stigma from auction borrowing).
86
See Extensions of Credit by Federal Reserve Banks, 72 FED. REG. 71,202,
71,202 (Dec. 17, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 201) (“TAF will be made only
to depository institutions that are in generally sound financial condition, are expected
to remain in that condition during the term of the advance and are eligible to receive
advances under section 10B of the Federal Reserve Act.”).
87
The legal authorization for these facilities comes from section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)). See also BAIRD WEBEL &
MARC LABONTE, GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN RESPONSE TO FINANCIAL
TURMOIL 16 (2010).
88
See David Reilly & Rolfe Winkler, Moral Hazard, Thy Price Is $3.3 Trillion,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2010.
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Kate Kelly, Bear Stearns Neared Collapse Twice in Frenzied Last Days, WALL
ST. J., May 29, 2008, at A14.
90
See Ralph Nader, The Great Fannie and Freddie Rip-Off, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26,
2011.
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Early on, the government’s assistance was ad hoc, as with the Bear Stearns
deal. As the financial crisis intensified, it became clear that many firms would
fold without direct assistance. The government started an array of ambitious
programs to prop up failing banks, the most famous of which is the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP), created by Congress in October 2008. 91 The
Treasury Department used its TARP funding and authority to buy roughly
$200 billion of preferred stock in banks and other companies, most of which
has been repaid. 92
Even though bailouts largely protected bank creditors, not all remained
intact. In another government-brokered acquisition, JPMorgan bought the
assets of failed thrift Washington Mutual, subject to the claims of its depositors
and general creditors. 93 It did not, however, assume any obligations to
Washington Mutual’s equity and subordinated debt holders, who were wiped
out in the deal. 94 Similarly, creditors of Lehman Brothers were left to fend for
themselves in bankruptcy. 95 Nevertheless, most creditors of failed banks
survived unimpaired thanks to government bailouts. As Professor David Skeel
notes, “[t]he bailouts of 2008 were creditor bailouts.” 96

II. TAXING SYSTEMIC RISK
A. Introduction
This Article focuses on financial taxes as a regulatory measure imposed to
improve the behavior of financial firms. Some might argue that financialsector taxes could be useful for other purposes, like retribution for harm caused
during the financial crisis or diminution of an overly large and powerful
financial sector. 97 Even if these goals are valid, they may have already been
achieved. As a recent magazine article puts it, “[a]fter surprisingly successful
financial reform, public vilification, and politics that have turned against them,
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See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765, 3767-3800.
92
See WEBEL & LABONTE, supra note 87, at 8.
93
See Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks Are Not Allowed in
Bankruptcy 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 985, 1034 (2010).
94
See id.
95
See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODDFRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2011).
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Id. at 147.
97
See Shackelford et al., supra note 7, at 781.
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the Masters of the Universe are masters no longer.” 98 In any event, this Article
does not consider these non-regulatory goals in any detail.
B. The Pigouvian Tradition
Taxing externalities is an old idea, usually attributed to economist A.C.
Pigou’s 1932 work, The Economics of Welfare. 99 A modern defense of the
Pigovian tradition comes from economist Greg Mankiw, who writes:
For at least two reasons, Pigovian taxes are popular among
economists. First, they are often the least invasive way to
remedy a market failure. They can restore an efficient
allocation of resources without requiring a heavy-handed
government intervention into the specific decisions made by
households and firms. Second, they raise revenue that the
government can use to reduce other taxes, such as income
taxes, which distort incentives and cause deadweight
losses. 100
Environmental taxes (e.g., carbon or gasoline taxes) are favorites of
Mankiw and his “Pigou Club.” Some commentators resist environmental
taxes because they are regressive. 101 A gasoline tax does not distinguish
between wealthy and poor drivers. Regardless of the merits of this resistance,
it has no obvious application to a corrective tax on the financial sector. If
anything, such a tax would be progressive, falling mainly on bankers and
owners of capital.
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell elaborate on the general superiority of
corrective taxes to regulation. They write, “[t]he reason that the corrective tax
is superior to quantity regulation is evident. The corrective tax effectively
harnesses the firm’s information about its control costs.” 102 Kaplow and
Shavell show that a Pigovian tax works even if the government does not know
the magnitude of harms caused by an externality. Without this knowledge, the
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government could not set the tax rate at its optimal level, which equals the
marginal cost of harms caused. Nevertheless, the tax can still limit the amount
of externalities (e.g., the amount of carbon output). Even under uncertainty
about harms, the tax serves the same function as direct regulation (limiting the
externality), only more efficiently (by harnessing producers’ information
about their own costs).
These arguments, coming from the strongest supporters of corrective
taxation, direct the inquiry for the rest of this Article. As argued earlier in this
Part, systemic risk is an externality that the government should curtail. One
avenue for doing so would be a corrective tax. Kaplow and Shavell rebut the
potential complaint that the harms caused by systemic risk are too uncertain
and speculative to warrant a corrective tax. Government could still use the tax
to limit total systemic risk. 103
However, we still have the problem of actually measuring the externality
that must be curtailed. Just what should policymakers try to limit?
Presumably, it is systemic risk, but we need some concrete and numerical
measurement of systemic risk in order to levy a corrective tax on finance. As
this Article proceeds, we will see that these problems present the most serious
obstacle to policymakers trying to enact a corrective tax on finance.
C. Design of a Corrective Tax on the Financial Sector
1. International Cooperation
Financial regulation is largely international. The premier regulatory
framework for controlling systemic risk, the Basel Accords, is the result of
international cooperation. 104 Suppose that the U.S. government effectively
identifies a marker that strongly correlates with systemic risk and chooses to
tax it. Financial firms may pay the tax, but they may simply move their
operations abroad. Indeed, the United Kingdom resists a European tax on
finance for just this reason, fearful that its London-based banks and financial
firms will simply relocate to New York or elsewhere. 105
A standard critique is that such an exit from markets is a policy failure. 106
Suppose that the United States alone enacted a financial-sector tax and drove
many of its banks to London or elsewhere. The United States would lose
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See supra Part I.E.2.
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See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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access to capital market. The exiting firms may still pose a systemic threat to
the U.S. economy. Continuing with the pollution analogy, the United States
does not win if its polluters simply move to the Bahamas. Moving from
analogy to recent history, we should note that the recent crisis affected the
global economy, even though it originated in U.S. financial markets. Even
today, the sovereign-debt crisis in Europe threatens U.S. markets. Ridding
ourselves of bankers does not rid us of systemic risk.
International cooperation has been successful in implementing global
standards on bank capital. 107 National regulators meet in Basel, decide on
policy, and bring their decisions back home for domestication via the
regulatory process. It is impossible to imagine this cooperative model
producing a new tax in the United States. anytime soon. Regulators cannot
adopt taxes via notice and comment the way they adopt Basel.
2. Not Taxing Bad Outcomes
Corrective taxes are usually straightforward. If we want less of
something—say pollution—we tax it. This simple logic does not apply to bank
failures. We may want fewer banks to fail, but we can hardly tax them when
they do. Indeed, the government is unlikely to let a major bank fail anytime
soon after the wreckage believed to have been caused by the failure of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008.
Similarly, corrective taxes should not apply at times of distress, when
failure seems particularly likely. The politics, economics, and regulation of
banks are already “procyclical” in that a banking crisis feeds on itself. As
discussed above, the failure of one destabilizes the balance sheet of other banks
and the confidence of their depositors. 108 Regulation can reinforce the vortex
of failure. Faltering banks must sell assets in order to meet capital
requirements, 109 but doing so only destabilizes markets even more. Increasing
the burdens on financial firms during distress would counter the goal of
financial stability.
3. Not Imposing Higher Income Taxes
As taxing failure is not an option, higher income taxes on banks might
seem promising. After all, income taxes are premised on the idea of burdening
winners by taxing them and assisting losers by granting them deductions. 110 A
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109
See supra Part I.D.
110
See Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal
Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1440 (2006)
(noting “morally relevant difference between winners and losers”).
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close examination of the income tax, though, will show that it fails as a
corrective tax on finance. Suppose that, in a tax-free world, an investment
bank IB would want enter into a derivatives contract with a counterparty CP
under the following terms:
•

If gold hits some preestablished benchmark next year, IB
receives $100 from CP.

•

If gold does not hit the benchmark, IB pays $100 to CP.

Let us assume that the benchmark is set so that the contract is “fair” (i.e.,
it has no ex-ante value to either side). Even though it has no expected value,
the contract does impose risk, in that possible outcomes are dispersed.111 Each
party will either win or lose $100, giving the possible outcomes a spread of
$200.
An income tax reduces this spread. A 50% income tax lowers the winner’s
after-tax gain to $50. But, if the government grants a deduction to the loser,
the loser may suffer an after-tax harm of only $50. The 50% tax cuts the aftertax spread in half, from $200 to $100. More generally, we can say that the
50% tax cuts in half the investment risk. So far, the income tax looks like a
plausible corrective tax as it seems to reduce risk.
Nevertheless, the parties can easily undo this risk reduction. In a tax-free
world, they would structure their bet to achieve a spread of $200. Under a
50% tax, they achieve this desired result simply by doubling the risky bet as

111

By granting a deduction worth 50% of losses, the tax system is “symmetric.”
The full loss offset condition requires that the tax system be symmetrical with respect
to gains and losses. See Lawrence Zelenak, The Sometimes-Taxation of the Returns
to Risk-Bearing Under a Progressive Income Tax, 59 SMU L. REV. 879 (2006). The
example and adjustments described above come from the “taxation of risk” literature
which aims to address risk taking of all types of taxpayers. Arguably, individuals do
not have the sophistication or access to capital needed to make the adjustments
contemplated by this literature. See Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with
a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423, 431–32 (2000). Clearly, this criticism has no force
against investment banks. A more potent criticism focuses on the assumption that the
income tax treats gains and losses symmetrically. In our example, IB and the
government share equally in the gains and losses. However, the U.S. corporate tax
does not always treat gains and losses symmetrically. Corporations may or may not
be able to deduct capital losses immediately, depending on whether they have
offsetting capital gains. See I.R.C. § 1211 (2012). They may or may not receive an
immediate tax benefit for ending a taxable year with an overall loss, depending on
profitability in prior years. See I.R.C. § 172 (2012). These limits are haphazard from
a financial perspective, as they depend on a corporation’s tax attributes, which have
little bearing on systemic risk.
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follows:
•

If gold hits the benchmark, IB $200 receives before tax. After
paying tax on the income, IB gains $100.

•

If gold does not hit the benchmark, IB pays CP $200. After
deducting the loss, IB loses $100.

Imposing the 50% tax does not change the after-tax results. IB easily
undoes the risk reduction coming from the income tax. With or without the
tax, it faces the same $200 spread between winning as losing. 112
At best then, higher taxes seem not to alter the firm’s overall riskiness.
One might even argue that the income tax makes systemic risk worse. In our
example, the income tax caused IB to double the size of its risky wager.
Ultimately, IB’s after-tax results do not change. If IB loses the bet, its $200
loss imposes only $100 of after-tax harm. The income tax does, however,
result in larger pre-tax losses. Market observers might become panicked by
observing the larger losses without considering their tax benefits. As noted
before, 113 perceptions do matter to the stability of financial firms. By
encouraging more before-tax risk taking, a higher income-tax rate might make
perceptions worse.
The example so far has focused on taxes and the riskiness of firm assets.
Taxes already distort the capital structure of incorporated firms, at least in that
U.S. corporations may deduct interest payments 114 but not dividends. Thus,
U.S. corporations have a tax incentive to finance their operations with debt
rather than equity. 115 Higher income taxes on corporations—the near universal
form of large financial firms—would provide them an incentive to fund with
even more debt, further threatening financial stability. 116
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Financial markets usually measure investment risk in terms of standard
deviation or the dispersion of possible returns. See Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing
Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 521, 573 (2009) (“The
key measure of risk is standard deviation.”).
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See supra Part I.C.
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See I.R.C. §163 (2012).
115
Several countries attempt to “integrate” the taxation of corporations and
shareholders, aiming to achieve a single level of tax. See MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL.,
TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 120 (3d ed. 2009).
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But cf. William Poole, Moral Hazard: The Long-Lasting Legacy of Bailouts, 65
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 17, 22 (Nov./Dec. 2009) (proposing to deny interest deductions for
financial firms).
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4. Taxing Factors Associated with Bad Outcomes
Let us continue with the prior example and ask why IB wants to bet on the
price of gold in the first place. We can identify three plausible motives:
•

Hedging: IB is hedging against some exposure it faces
elsewhere. For example, IB might simply be offsetting another
gold contract demanded by a customer. The contract with CP
reduces its overall risk. This motivation is clearly allowed.

•

“Alpha” Hunting: IB is capitalizing on some particular
knowledge or expertise about what the future holds for the price
of gold. In financial jargon, alpha is the portion of investment
returns derived from acumen or research. According to
proponents of market efficiency, alpha does not exist. 117
Bankers and high-profile investors invariably claim that it
does. 118

•

“Volatility” Hunting: Bankers at IB are simply gambling. In
financial jargon, volatility is risk, which requires no acumen to
assume. 119 If gold goes up, the bankers pay themselves
handsomely. If gold goes down, they shrug it off and try again
next year. To make the example more extreme, suppose they bet
$10 billion on gold contracts. If gold goes up, the bankers
receive a huge bonus that sets them up for life. If gold goes
down, the bankers get fired but face no other repercussions, even
if they trigger insolvency or a systemic crisis.

Clearly, the hedging motivation is benign, even beneficial, to systemic
risk. Volatility hunting clearly harms the financial system. Alpha has less
clear effects. If IB has superior knowledge and can capitalize on it with little
or no risk, financial regulators should have no qualms. We should, however,
be concerned that bankers at IB are deluding themselves about their abilities,

117

See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 230 (rev.
ed. 2003).
118
Cf. Martin L. Liebowitz, Alpha Hunters and Beta Grazers, 61 FIN. ANALYSTS
J., 32, 33 (Sept./Oct. 2005) (discussing attributes of highly successful investors like
Warren Buffett).
119
Cf. id. at 39 n.1 (“The great mass of investors should treat the market as being
highly efficient and should start with the null hypothesis that all assets are fairly
priced.”).
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claiming that they are seeking alpha but in reality seeking volatility. There
may be intermediate cases of concern as well. Perhaps IB does have superior
knowledge about the likely price of gold next but cannot capitalize on it
without exposing itself to some significant risk of failure.
The Volcker rule outlaws most forms of “proprietary trading” financial
firms that accept insured deposits 120 (most systemically important financial
firms in the U.S. accept deposits). 121 Conceptually, the Volcker rule tries to
banish both alpha and volatility hunting. It continues to allow for hedging and
other activities perceived to be less risky. Regulators face a massive challenge,
however, in implementing this rule. The categories given above seem clear
cut, but in reality they are not. Regulators must draft rules that identify
particular transactions as falling within allowed or prohibited categories. 122
Drafting efforts to date have proven to be extraordinarily complex 123 and
controversial (at least when compared to other forms of financial
regulation). 124
Perhaps tax can act as the sieve. Firms that do particularly well may
simply be taking on a lot of risk via proprietary trading (i.e., alpha and
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See Nathaniel Popper, Regulators Weigh Public Input on ‘Volcker Rule’, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/15/business/la-fi-volckerrule-20120215 [https://perma.cc/X2L4-G5FZ].
121
“Systemic importance” is, of course, in the eye of the beholder. To date, the
most consequential designation as such has come from the Financial Stability Board.
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Mellon; Citigroup; Goldman Sachs Group; JP Morgan Chase; Morgan Stanley; State
Street; and Wells Fargo. See Fin. Stability Bd., Policy Measures to Address
(Nov.
4
2011),
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Financial
Institutions
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MH9U-J9R7]. All of them are “bank holding companies” that
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BILLION,
https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/HCSGreaterThan10B.aspx
[https://perma.cc/S9XW-SGPG](last visited Oct. 10, 2017) (listing the top 50 bank
holding companies).
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See generally Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain
Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed.
Reg. 68,846 (Nov. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 351).
123
Davis Polk is likely the leading private law firm dealing with Dodd-Frank
implementation. Its “summary” version of the Volcker Rule’s prohibition on
proprietary trading runs 20 pages and reads more like an electrical schematic than a
legal document. Cf. Summary of the Volker Rule Study – Proprietary Trading, (Jan.
19, 2011), https://www.davispolk.com/publications/summary-volcker-rule-study-–proprietary-trading/ [https://perma.cc/HQW6-ANZ6] (summarizing Volcker Rule).
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volatility hunting). If that is the case, then good performance in one year may
well predict a bad result in later years. Thus, corrective tax on particularly
good outcomes might curtail systemic risk.
This idea faces two obstacles. First, we would need to be convinced that
particularly good performance is strongly correlated with something we want
to curtail. Second, even if we could make that case, we would need to define
a tax that defines particularly good performance. The financial activities tax,
advocated by the IMF, is a plausible candidate for such a tax.125 The
theoretical case for this and similar taxes on “success” is discussed below. 126
The government may also seek markers of systemic risk other than
particularly good financial results. Two candidates discussed below are taxing
leverage 127 and taxing financial transactions. 128 Each of these has a plausible
connection to systemic risk. Leverage reduces the ability of a firm to absorb
losses before it is thrown into insolvency. Frequent trading might be
associated with alpha and volatility hunting. Moreover, many financial firms
rely heavily on short-term debt-like repurchase agreements (repo) that must be
renewed frequently. Repo is an unstable source of financing that can disappear
during a panic. A financial transactions tax would apply every time a firm
renews repo lending (potentially daily) and could encourage financial firms to
seek out long-term, more stable financing.
D. Institutional Considerations of a Corrective Tax on Finance
Section A began by taking some non-regulatory justifications for a
financial-sector tax off the table. Section B offered the “Pigovian” rationale
for preferring a regulatory tax over direct regulation. This Section will discuss
institutional and pragmatic considerations for choosing the balance between
direct regulation and corrective taxation of the financial sector.
First, and most powerfully, regulatory efforts may already be effective in
curtailing systemic risk. Dodd-Frank in particular is not yet fully
implemented. If Dodd-Frank is successful in curtailing systemic risk, then the
rationale for imposing a corrective tax is significantly diminished. For
example, Dodd-Frank authorizes the federal government to shut down and
resolve troubled financial firms. The goal of this resolution authority is to
avoid both government bailouts and complex bankruptcy proceedings. 129
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Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in,
and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg.
68,846.
126
See infra Part IV.
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See infra Part V.
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See infra Part III.
129
See SKEEL, supra note 95.
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Similarly, Basel III will require banks to hold more capital than they held
before the financial crisis.
A well-designed corrective tax may seem superior to regulation for
institutional reasons. Recent critics have complained that U.S. financial
regulators are too cozy and accommodating with their wards. Matt Taibbi,
writing for the Rolling Stone, (in)famously called Goldman Sachs “a great
vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its
blood funnel into anything that smells like money.” 130 According to Taibbi,
Hank Paulson (former head of Goldman and then Secretary of Treasury during
most of the crisis) rigged government bailout efforts for the benefit of
Goldman. 131 Paulson let Goldman competitor Lehman Brothers collapse but
made sure to bail out AIG, which owed Goldman billions of dollars. 132 Taibbi
is not alone in his harsh treatment of both Wall Street and Washington. 133
Regardless of the harsh critics, financial regulation is inherently
discretionary. The bailouts of 2008 and 2009 were mainly ad hoc, devised and
implemented in response to current events. Even during placid times, financial
regulation relies on ambiguous concepts like “safety and soundness” which
entrust discretion to regulators. Similarly, banks and other interested parties
are currently lobbying regulators for exemptions from the reach of the Volcker
Rule and other elements of Dodd-Frank. 134
We should not, however, compare the messy “real world” of financial
regulation with some idealized system for taxing banks. Any financial-sector
tax in the United States. must come from Congress, which currently appears
incapable of creating sound tax policy. 135 Congress regularly uses special
giveaways in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC or Code) to curry favor with
voters and supporters, and we could expect Congress to do much the same with
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2012),
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any new system of tax. For example, a financial transactions tax should apply
in principle to any financial transaction. Congress, though, would probably
seek exemptions for certain transactions (like trading in U.S. government debt)
and for certain parties (like pension funds). 136
Indeed, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) appears to have bowed to
political realities following the financial crisis. In general, when a corporation
has a net loss for a year, it may carry that loss and deduct that loss against
income earned in later years. 137 Past losses then create a valuable tax asset that
firms can use in the future. However, the Code limits the ability of
corporations to deduct such losses following a change in corporate control.138
The policy rationale is to prevent healthy corporations from acquiring the tax
losses of other corporations.
Several bailout recipients, like General Motors, possessed net operating
losses. According to the text of the Code, the government bailouts triggered
the change-in-control limits. Controversially, the IRS waived any such claim,
ruling that General Motors and other bailout recipients could continue to use
their prior losses without limit. 139 According to the IRS, imposing the limits
would be contrary to the policy of the statute and would frustrate the
government’s attempts to assist the troubled firms. 140 Critics, however, claim
that the IRS was covertly enhancing the bailouts by waiving statutory claims
to billions of dollars revenue. 141 This Article does not take sides on that debate
but simply notes that IRS was not able to maintain a disinterested neutrality
toward firms affected by the crisis. From an institutional perspective, we
should be skeptical that tax authorities would be more resilient to political or
industry pressure than financial regulators.
A corrective tax may also more difficult to change in the future. Tax cuts
and tax increases are highly politicized and polarized. Were Congress to adopt
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a tax on financial transactions in 2012, it would likely become a permanent
fixture even if we later determine that the tax does nothing to curtail systemic
risk. The revenue would become part of the budget, and Congress would need
to pay for its loss. In short, Congress would have difficulty fixing a failed
corrective tax on finance. Financial regulators, in contrast, have more
flexibility in adapting to changing times, as evidenced by the rapid pace of
developments following the financial crisis (in particular Dodd-Frank and
Basel III).

III. FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS TAX
A. Introduction
To date, the most politically viable form of financial-sector taxation has
been the financial transaction tax, particularly in continental Europe as
discussed in the next Section. In the United States, though, a new federal tax
of any sort is a non-starter for the Republican Party. A few Democrats
supported the financial transaction tax, but the Obama Administration did not,
preferring instead a milder fee assessed on the liabilities of financial
institutions rather than on their transactions. 142 The EU tax, if enacted in the
United States, would produce annual revenue of perhaps $70 billion. 143 In
contrast, the Obama fee would produce about $6 billion per year and would
presumptively expire after 10 years.144
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Despite sturdy political obstacles in the United States and the United
Kingdom, the financial-transactions tax has potent support, from George Soros
to Pope Benedict. 145 Occupy Wall Street, often criticized for its lack of a
specific agenda, 146 does seem to embrace is a “financial transactions tax.” 147
Given its potential for revenue and impact on a despised financial sector, a
financial transaction may still emerge as politically viable in the United States
and the EU.
Keynes suggested such a tax in his General Theory, arguing, “[t]he
introduction of a substantial Government transfer tax on all transactions might
prove the most serviceable reform available, with a view to mitigating the
predominance of speculation over enterprise in the United States.” 148
Despite its Keynesian heritage, the transaction tax is most associated with
James Tobin’s proposal to stabilize foreign-exchange rates. 149 From the end
of World War II until the early 1970s, currencies exchanged according to rates
fixed by the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944. 150 The U.S. dollar became the
official reserve currency of the world economy and was fixed relative to gold
at $35 per ounce. 151 Other nations fixed their currencies relative to the
dollar. 152 Bretton Woods collapsed in 1971, when President Nixon abandoned
the gold standard and allowed the dollar to float relative to gold.153 Shortly
thereafter, other nations allowed their currencies to float relative to the
dollar. 154
Tobin proposed his tax in the period following the collapse of Bretton
Woods. He largely welcomed floating exchange rates, but was concerned that
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the efficiency of currency markets threatened economic stability:
Specifically, the mobility of financial capital limits viable
differences among national interest rates and thus severely
restricts the ability of central banks and governments to
pursue monetary and fiscal policies appropriate to their
internal economies. Likewise speculation on exchange rates,
whether its consequences are vast shifts of official assets and
debts or large movements of exchange rates themselves, have
serious and frequently painful real internal economic
consequences. 155
Tobin’s response was a tax (perhaps 1%) on all conversions of one
currency for another, including purchases of goods and services from
abroad. 156 Doing so would “throw some sand in the wheels of our excessively
efficient international money markets.” 157 Tobin was no isolationist, favored
free trade, and preferred a system of greater coordination of fiscal and
monetary policies among nations. In a world of individual nation states with
separate currencies, however, he would “regretfully recommend” a system of
“greater financial segmentation between nations.” 158
The Tobin tax was designed to slow movement of financial capital from
one currency to another. Limited to its original terms, then, the Tobin tax does
not respond to the recent financial crisis. No one thinks violent movements of
currencies across nations caused the crisis. In broader terms, however, many
suggest that an overly active and efficient financial sector may have done so.
Hoping to slow the fast spinning wheels of finance, modern reformers have
adapted Tobin’s currency-tax proposal to apply to a wide range of financial
transactions.
B. EU Proposed Financial Transaction Tax
The leading proposal for a financial transactions tax today comes from the
EU. In September 2011, the European Commission proposed a Council
Directive that would establish a financial transaction tax (FTT) across the
EU. 159 This FTT reflects the distinctive political structure of the EU. The EU
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itself mandates the FTT and sets the basic design of the FTT. 160 Individual
member states (Germany, France, etc.) collect and enforce the tax. 161
Moreover, the revenue produced by the FTT belongs to the member states, not
the EU itself. 162
France and Germany strongly support the tax, but the United Kingdom
remains opposed, concerned that the tax would harm London’s financial
sector. 163 Indeed, U.K. opposition to the tax has affected the entire EU
enterprise, complicating attempts at dealing with Europe’s very current
banking crisis. In December 2011, the United Kingdom alone dissented from
a new EU pact aimed at improving fiscal discipline and saving the euro from
possible collapse. 164 Some of the sticking points for the United Kingdom were
the tax and other possible harms to London’s financial sector. 165
Undeterred by Anglo-Saxon resistance, France unilaterally implemented
such a tax in summer 2012, hoping to prompt the rest of the EU to follow. 166
In early 2013, supporters of an EU tax achieved a partial victory. Eleven of
the 27 Member States (including France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) obtained
EU authorization to adopt and coordinate their own financial transactions tax
pursuant to “enhanced cooperation.” 167 In short, the 11 adopting states can
coordinate their taxes via the EU without involving the other 16 states. 168
Originally, the tax was expected to go into effect in 2014, 169 but
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implementation has been repeatedly postponed because of disagreements
among the member states.
The tax is levied on any “financial transaction,” defined as a transaction
involving any financial instrument. In a curious omission, the EU excludes
from the FTT the conversion of one currency for another. The very transaction
targeted by the original Tobin tax is exempted by the FTT.
The EU identifies the obvious rationales behind the FTT. First and
foremost, it would produce revenue. Seeking revenue from financial firms is
justified in that they caused or contributed to the financial crisis and resulting
expense and hardships. More subtly, the EU defends the proposition that it
(rather than individual member states) should mandate the tax. 170 The EU
hopes to maintain a level playing field across member states and to avoid what
it calls “fragmentation.” 171 Thus, coordinated action is required. The EU gives
a nod to the regulatory aspirations of financial sector taxes. Without
elaboration, the EU claims it expects the FTT to achieve “financial stability”
and “to create appropriate disincentives for overly risky transactions and to
complement regulatory measures.” 172 Clearly with its eyes on the United
States, the EU maintains that “a coordinated approach at international level is
the best option” and that its proposals “should pave the way towards a
coordinated approach with the most relevant international partners.” 173 Like
the first commandment given to Moses, 174 the EU instructs the member states
to have no other FTTs. 175
The EU proposal is fairly simple in its terms. If adopted, it would need to
be implemented by individual member states.176 Member states would charge
the tax. 177 In rough terms, it would work like a sales tax, applying to the face
amount of any transaction. The general rate is 0.1% (10 basis points) of the
amount involved in the transaction. 178 So, a €1 billion transaction would
generate a €1 million tax. Derivatives contracts, though, often do not involve
the exchange of money up front but are measured in terms of a “notional
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Id. at 2–3.
Id.
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Id. at 24.
173
Id. at 3.
174
Cf. Exodus 20:3 (“You shall have no other gods before me.”).
175
Proposal, supra note 159, at 10.
176
Id. at 23.
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Id. at 20.
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Id. at 19–20.
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amount.” 179 In the case of derivatives, the tax rate is 0.01% (1 basis point) of
the notional amount. 180
C. Possible Advantages
The FTT does not have an obvious regulatory element. It applies to all
financial transactions, whether good, bad or indifferent. The FTT might
conceivably curtail systemic failure simply by shrinking the size of the
financial sector. Even if such an effect is a good one, the approach could
hardly be called regulatory. Moreover, the balance sheet levies, discussed in
the next Part, would seem better targeted toward overly large financial
institutions.
One possible advantage would be to discourage interconnectedness in the
financial sector. Financial firms become connected by transacting with each
other. For example, American International Group (AIG) posed systemic risk
during 2008 because it had sold billions of dollars worth of credit default
swaps (CDS) to other financial institutions.181 Similarly, banks sold off their
mortgage portfolios by “securitizing” them into CDOs. 182
These
transactions—the most infamous of the financial crisis—are all of a fairly
long-term duration. A one-time tax of 0.1% might make them slightly costlier,
but probably will not discourage them. The FTT is far more effective at
curtailing “high frequency trading” in which firms buy and sell assets over the
course of a few minutes. The problem during the financial crisis, though, was
not too much liquidity. It was too little, when firms holding CDOs and similar
instruments could not readily sell them.
The best argument in favor of an FTT is that it would increase the cost of
short-term borrowing. Financial firms rely heavily on short-term borrowing
like repo. 183 The FTT should apply every time a firm rolls over its repo
obligations, often on a daily basis. Because repo has such a short duration, its
cost is usually very low. But, firms funding through repo need to be able to

179

For example, parties to an interest rate swap would exchange interest payments
on a notional amount. One party would pay a fixed 5% rate but receive a variable rate
(like LIBOR). A notional amount of $1 million results in fixed payment of $50,000.
Usually, the notional amount does not trade hands, only interest payments. See
generally HULL, supra note 27, at 150.
180
Implementing Enhanced Cooperation, supra note 160, at 26.
181
Credit Derivatives: The Great Untangling, ECONOMIST (Nov. 6, 2008),
http://www.economist.com/node/12552204 [https://perma.cc/5C76-RN8V].
182
See HULL, supra note 27, at 547.
183
Id. at 76 (2012); Gary Groton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the
Run on Repo 1 (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 09-14, 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440752 [https://perma.cc/S5C7-7YEF].
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access the market on a daily basis. During a panic, repo lenders could simply
walk away, causing the equivalent of a bank run.
An FTT at the rate proposed in Europe (0.1%) could destroy overnight
repo. If applied over the 252 trading days in year, an FTT would almost make
overnight repo more expensive than consumer credit cards. 184
D. Cascading and Conglomeration
A significant problem, noted by the IMF and others, is that an FTT has a
cascading effect. Let us start with a simple, nonfinancial example to see the
problem clearly. Suppose that a nation wants to adopt a 5% sales tax, but the
tax applies to business sales in addition to retail sales. Suppose further that
three steps are involved in making kitchen tables. Someone must obtain the
wood. Someone must cut it into boards. And, someone crafts the boards into
a table. If each step costs $300 (including profits), then the table should sell
for $900.
Whether each step should be conducted at one table firm or three specialty
firms should be determined by which arrangement is more efficient. But,
imposing a sales tax on business sales artificially distorts that organization of
production. If one firm conducts all production, the tax is $45. But, if separate
firms do so, the tax “cascades” at each step. The first step costs $300 for a $15
tax. The second step costs $600 for a $30 tax. And, the final sale costs $900
for a $45 tax. The cascading tax thus encourages concentrated production even
if specialization across multiple firms would be more efficient.
A similar, but more complicated, phenomenon could occur under an FTT.
For example, a bank might find it prudent to hedge against certain interest or
currency fluctuations. One option would be to enter into a derivatives
transaction with another firm. Another would be for the firm to hedge its risks
directly by creating its own derivatives division or altering its overall portfolio.
The incentive is the same as it was with the tables. The firm has an incentive
to take on more activities itself rather than farming out work to other firms.
The effects are ambiguous. By discouraging inter-firm transactions, the
FTT may make financial institutions less dependent on one another and less
interconnected. On the other hand, an FTT may encourage firms to grow in
size, making financial distress at one firm more disruptive to the overall system
and economy.

184

Assume that the repo rate is otherwise 0% and that the repo transaction is for 1
million euros. A daily FTT of 0.1%, compounded over 252 days, forces the borrower
to repay 1.286 million euros on an annualized basis.
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IV. FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES TAX
A. IMF Proposed Financial Activities Tax
In September 2009, leaders of the G20 met in Pittsburgh to discuss
recovery from the financial crisis. 185 The G20 leaders tasked the IMF with
preparing a report describing “how the financial sector could make a fair and
substantial contribution toward paying for any burdens associated with
government interventions to repair the banking system.” 186 The IMF
responded ten months later, setting out its case for a “financial activities tax”
(FAT). 187
Obviously, the FAT would produce revenue, which the IMF envisions
being used for general purposes. 188 The IMF suggests a 5% rate 189 along with
three different designs. The design producing the most revenue would yield
around $50 billion a year for the United States. 190 In the current political
climate, the FAT is a non-starter in the U.S. Congress. Few Republicans are
willing to raise taxes or create new ones. The financial sector also has natural
allies in the Democratic party. Democratic members from New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut have historically resisted reforms that would increase
taxes on finance. 191 Even if the U.S. Congress were interested in the FAT, the
United States would probably need to enact one unilaterally. Europe, at
present, is focusing its attention on taxing financial transactions rather than
financial profits. 192
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See G20, Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit (Sept. 24–25, 2009),
https://www.g20.org/Content/DE/StatischeSeiten/Breg/G7G20/Anlagen/G20erklaerung-pittsburgh-2009-en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1
[https://perma.cc/3JRN-RSZW].
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Id.
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at
4–5
(June
2010),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/062710b.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V2H4QBDC] [hereinafter IMF].
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Id. at 5.
189
Id. at 22.
190
Id. at 70 (The IMF suggests three different tax bases. The largest would capture
6.6% of U.S. GDP.); see World Bank Data, County Profile: United States (Aug. 2,
2017), http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states [https://perma.cc/6AUX53U5] (U.S. GDP for 2010 is $14.96 trillion.).
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See, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham & Mitchell L. Engler, The Carried Interest
Controversy: Let's Not Get Carried Away, 61 TAX L. REV. 121, 138 n.80 (2008)
(discussing Senator Charles Schumer’s opposition to higher taxes on hedge fund and
private equity managers).
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Proposal, supra note 159, at 4.
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The IMF offers the regulatory purpose of curtailing risk taking. 193 In broad
terms, the FAT would apply to both profits and compensation. 194 A regulatory
FAT (dubbed FAT3 by the IMF) would apply only after profits and
compensation exceeds a certain normal threshold. The rationale was discussed
above—good outcomes in a particular year suggest risk taking or gambling,
which could lead to bad outcomes in later years. 195
B. The FAT’s Potential Success in Taxing Investment Risk
1. The Call Option Analogy
The FAT is similar to an option held by the government. If the firm
performs well, the government gets paid. In a sense, it “exercises” the option.
If the firm does not perform well, the government does not get paid, but loses
nothing either. The FAT, by effectively granting the government options on
the stock of large financial firms, arguably burdens their risk-taking. To see
why, suppose that a bank starts with assets of $100 million. The government
holds the right, exercisable in one year, to buy 5% of the firm’s assets at their
current value (i.e., $5 million). Thus, the government holds a call option over
assets with a current value of $5 million.
•

Suppose the firm doubles the value of its assets over the course
of the year, growing them to $200 million. The government
exercises its right because the assets it can buy (5%) are worth
more today ($10 million) than their original value ($5 million).
The net value to the government is the difference, or $5 million.

•

Suppose the firm assets fall by 50%. The government does not
exercise its option because the assets are worth less than their
original value.

In effect, the option gives the government the right to take 5% of the
growth of the asset. But, the government does not share in any losses. An
FAT, imposed at a 5% rate, gives the government similar claim.

193

See IMF, supra note 187, at 12.
See id. at 5; Shaviro, supra note 7, at 781.
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194

40

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 16, No. 1

2. Relation between Option Values and Risk
Option theory recognizes the relationship between good outcomes and
higher risk by assigning higher prices to options on riskier assets. 196
Investment risk refers to the dispersion or variance of possible results. A bond
that is sure to grow by 2% is not risky because there is only one outcome (2%
growth). Stock that might go up or down 20% in a year is risky. Stock that
might go up or down by 50% in a year is even riskier. Quantitatively, risk is
measured using standard deviation, a statistical measure of dispersion around
the average (or mean) return of a particular stock. 197
Higher levels of risk make options more valuable. Suppose we have two
assets, both worth $100. One is sure to grow by 2%. An option to buy this
asset for $102 is worthless. The other might go up or down by 20%. Clearly,
an option to buy this asset for $102 has some value. If the asset goes up, the
option holder has the right to buy an asset worth $120 for only $102. Option
pricing models, like Black-Scholes, provide the value and can illustrate the
relationship between risk and option value. 198
Before, we saw that the IMF FAT is similar to a government held option.
For now, let us assume that the FAT is the same as an option over the assets
of a financial firm. Now, we will see how the value of the FAT increases as
the firm invests in riskier assets. Suppose that the firm, at the beginning of the
year, holds assets of $100 billion. The firm chooses how risky it wants to be
in investing those assets. It could choose no risk (0%) or very high risk (100%)
or something in between. At the end of the year, the government receives 5%
of the growth of firm assets but does not bear any costs if the assets fall in
value. The following graphic shows how the government’s claim, valued ex
ante, varies depending on the investment risk selected by the firm. The vertical
represents the ex-ante value of the FAT. The horizontal represents the level
of investment risk, measured in terms of standard deviation.
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See HULL, supra note 27, at 7–8.
See HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 459–
64 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2011).
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FAT Value vs Investment Risk
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Clearly, the value of the FAT is nearly linear when related to the level of
risk selected by the firm. 199 Thus, we may think of the FAT (at least as
modeled above) as imposing a flat rate of tax on risk taking.
An alternative design, suggested by the IMF, would apply the FAT only
when profits exceed some hurdle rate of return. 200 The hurdle rates are
intended to capture “excess returns” which might represent rents enjoyed by
the financial sector or excessive risk seeking. 201 The following graph assumes
that the FAT does not apply until after the firm has a 10% return on assets.
Thus, the government receives 5% of all profits that exceed $10 billion.
FAT Value with 10 Threshold vs Investment Risk
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A close approximation is that the option price equals 40% of the current stock
price times volatility (expressed in standard deviations of return).
200
IMF, supra note 187, at 68.
201
Id.
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In the prior graph, the FAT was applied at an essentially flat rate to all
levels of risk. In this graph, the FAT largely does not apply until the firm takes
on a certain level of investment risk. The graph marks a risk level of 7% as
the point at which the FAT begins to apply, but it is largely flat after that point.
3. A Risk-Progressive FAT
The IMF FAT proposals indirectly tax risk at a flat rate. Adding an
exemption essentially creates a zero bracket for risk, but the flat structure
remains. The marginal social cost of risk taking in finance, however, may not
be flat. If a very conservative firm takes on more risk, it may just barely
increase its risk of failure. If an aggressive firm takes on more risk, it may
send it to collapse. Adding a threshold to the FAT does not capture that
dynamic. Instead, the threshold simply adds a zero bracket, after which all
risk is taxed at virtually the same flat rate.
Ideally, the FAT would impose a progressive rate of tax on risk. The rate
of tax should increase along with the rate of return that the firm earns. For
example, the FAT rate could equal half the rate of return that the firm itself
earns. This does not mean that the firm shares half of its return with the
government. Suppose that the firm described above starts with $100 billion.
It has a 20% return for the year, earning $20 billion. Its tax rate would be 10%,
and it would pay $2 billion under the modified FAT. If it earned $30 billion
(a 30% return), its tax rate would be 15%, and it would pay $4.5 billion to the
government.
The following graph illustrates how such a progressive FAT would relate
the burden of the FAT and investment risk undertaken by the firm.
$12 billion

Progressive FAT Value vs Investment Risk

$8 billion

$4 billion

25

50

Thus, the ex-ante burden of the tax accelerates as risk-taking increases. It
is not flat as it was under the FAT proposed by the IMF.
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We should be clear that the burdens imposed by this progressive FAT
depend not only on the size of profits but also on the rate of return to earn
them. A large firm with $100 billion in assets might produce a 2% return or
$2 billion. It would pay tax of only 1%. A smaller firm with only $10 billion
in assets might produce the same $2 billion. Since its rate of return is higher
(20%), it would pay a higher rate, 10% under my suggestion. This disparity
would be justified if we think that the smaller firm produced its return by
taking on more socially harmful risk.
C. The FAT’s Failure to Tax Systemic Risk
To impose the FAT, regulators and legislators would, of course, need to
identify the taxpayers and the tax base. The obvious method of identifying
FAT taxpayers is to identify firms subject to enhanced oversight under DoddFrank. Bank holding companies with assets over $50 billion make up the bulk
of this category, which includes virtually all of the name brands in banking
like Goldman Sachs. 202 A handful of non-bank firms (like AIG) will likely
join them in being subject to Dodd-Frank oversight. 203
Defining the right tax base, though, proves much tougher. A corrective
tax on finance must apply to systemic risk, which may well be different from
the investment risk that the FAT could tax quite effectively. To see the
difference, above, I used a hypothetical firm that held $100 billion in assets.
The FAT quite effectively taxes the risk inherent in the firm’s investments.
The FAT could even be tweaked to impose progressively greater burdens as
risk increases. But, the firm’s systemic threat depends not only on such
investment risk. It also turns on the capital structure of the firm. Compare two
financial firms, both with $100 billion of assets, and otherwise identical except
for their capital structures:
•

At EQ Corp., the $100 billion is completely attributable to
shareholder contributions and retained earnings. So long as EQ
Corp. has no creditors, it cannot become insolvent. And, if it
cannot become insolvent, it poses no obvious systemic risk to the

202
Victoria MaGrane & Damian Paletta, Regulators Begin Process of Labeling the
ST.
J.
(Aug.
20,
2010),
‘Systemically
Important’,
WALL
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487044884045754417236795817
84 [https://perma.cc/RQ5E-M7AE]; see also Dodd-Frank §165(a)(1) (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5365(a)(1)) (explaining that the purpose of the Dodd-Frank statute is
to mitigate the risk that could arise from the “material financial distress or failure,
or ongoing activities, of large, interconnected financial institutions . . . Board of
Governors and bank holding companies with total consolidated assets equal to or
greater than $50,000,000,000 . . . .”).
203
Id.
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financial system.
•

At LEV Corp., the $100 billion is financed with $5 billion of
equity and $95 billion of debt. If LEV Corp. loses $5 billion, it
will become insolvent and potentially pose a systemic threat to
the financial system.

The FAT, as proposed by the IMF, would quite effectively burden the
firms for investing the $100 billion in risky ventures. As a policy matter,
though, there is no reason to keep EQ Corp. from going wild in risking its
assets. It is funded 100% with equity and cannot become insolvent. LEV
Corp., in contrast, should be restrained because of its narrow margin.
The FAT, though, fails to distinguish between these firms. It expressly
seeks to encourage neutrality in the choice between debt and equity. 204 This
is quite wrongheaded if the FAT is to function as a good regulatory tax, which
would need to place a much higher burden on LEV Corp. At a minimum, a
regulatory tax would need to differentiate between firms based on their
likelihood of failure. Clearly, the FAT fails in accomplishing this task.
This is not to say that FAT model is worthless. The risk of failure is largely
determined by two factors: investment risk (which the FAT elegantly captures)
and leverage (which the FAT treats indifferently than Basel). 205 The Basel
model (discussed previously) 206 asks the right questions but failed to prevent
the recent financial crisis. 207 Perhaps Basel should use the FAT model in its
regulations. Regulators could (and perhaps should) interpret high profits as a
mark of high investment risk. If a leveraged firm like LEV Corp. has high
profits, it should be forced to increase the amount of equity and other capital
it has on its books. A firm like EQ Corp., though, would be left alone because
it already has abundant capital.

V. BALANCE SHEET LEVIES
A. Introduction
The discussion of the IMF FAT showed how it failed to reach systemic
risk. The FAT may be quite effective at reaching investment risk, or the

204

See IMF, supra note 187, at 66 (“A key feature of this form of profit taxation is
that it is neutral with respect to marginal financing and investment decisions.”).
205
Id. at 68.
206
See supra Part I.E.2.
207
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate
Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 1010–11 (2011) (“After
reviewing a preliminary version of the Basel III proposals, a prominent U.K. financial
commentator observed, ‘[w]e can say with conviction now that Basel II failed.’”).
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volatility inherent in a firm’s investment strategy. It does not, however,
distinguish between firms that can and cannot handle high levels of risk. This
Part discusses the inverse problem. Now we see proposals that tax the amount
of debt that firms carry but do not differentiate between firms based on whether
their debt levels are actually harmful.
B. Dodd-Frank’s Near Miss: Financial Crisis Special Assessment
At the end of June 2010, the U.S. Congress seemed poised to enact a bank
tax as part of the Dodd-Frank Act. 208 Senate and House negotiators added a
bank tax provision to the bill in late June in order to offset the additional
regulatory costs of the Act. 209 Senator Scott Brown—the Republican elected
to replace the late Edward Kennedy—balked at the new tax, writing a letter to
Senator Dodd and Representative Frank threatening to withhold his support
for the bill. 210 Brown’s support was crucial for passage of Dodd-Frank, which
could not survive the Senate without 60 votes. 211 Almost immediately, the tax
was dropped from the bill, which Brown did ultimately support along with two
other Republican Senators. 212
The dropped provision would have imposed a “financial crisis special
assessment.” 213 The assessment was not permanent revenue. Instead, it would

208
See David M. Herszenhorn, Bank Tax is Dropped in Overhaul of Industry, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2010.
209
See Mike Ferullo, Lawmakers Remove $19 Billion Bank Levy in Bid to Secure
Senate Support for Reform, BNA BANKING DAILY (June 30, 2010).
210
See Herszenhorn, supra note 208.
211
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http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/06/30/browns_threat_
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See U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress – 2nd Session (Conference
Report
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4173),
July
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2010,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congres
s=111&session=2&vote=0028 [https://perma.cc/79UL-53KW]; GERALD P. WILSON,
MANAGING TO THE NEW REGULATORY REALITY: DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE DODDFRANK ACT 64–65 (2011).
213
Characterizing the June 25, 2010 agreement is difficult. A conference
committee of House and Senate negotiators approved a conference report containing
the tax on June 25, 2010. Responding to Senator Brown’s threat, the conferees
amended their report, which they issued on June 29, 2010. Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 1114173,
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have raised $19 billion (or 133% of Dodd-Frank’s 10-year costs, whichever
was less) 214 and would have been collected over four years. 215 By dropping
the assessment, Congress needed to find alternative revenue or spending cuts
to pay for the costs of Dodd-Frank. They found it by curtailing the much-hated
TARP and by increasing FDIC premiums. 216
The assessment would have applied to financial institutions with over $50
billion in assets (or hedge funds with over $10 billion in assets). 217 The
proposed text did not define a rate or a taxable base, but simply granted
regulators the authority to enact a levy based on a variety of factors. 218 The
factors could include any “risk-related factors as [the Financial Stability
Oversight] Council may determine to be appropriate.” 219 The proposed
language did list some factors clearly relevant to systemic risk, like leverage,
activities, and interconnectedness. 220 Other factors related to non-risk policy
goals, such as “the company’s importance as a source of credit for low-income,
minority, or underserved communities and the impact the failure of such
company would have on the availability of credit in such communities.” 221
Amounts collected would have been placed in a newly created “financial
crisis special assessment fund” maintained by the FDIC. 222 Interestingly, the
fund would not have been used for general revenue, bailout costs, or for any
other particular purpose. 223 Instead, the FDIC would have simply maintained
the fund until 2035 and then would have been used to pay down the federal
debt. 224
The limited life of the assessment, the use of the funds, and the context in
which both were proposed all indicate that the assessment was not a serious
attempt at corrective taxation. It was simply a mechanism to satisfy federal
budgetary rules. The statutory language described who would pay the fee but
shed few clues on how regulators would assess the levy.

[https://perma.cc/U49Z-ETEG] [hereinafter Tentative Report]. The financial crisis
special assessment is levied by Tentative Report § 1601.
214
Tentative Report, supra note 213, at 2306 (§ 1601(a)).
215
Id. at 2307 (§ 1601(b)).
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See WILSON, supra note 211, at 65; Viser, supra note 211.
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Id. at 2309–12 (§ 1601(g), (h)).
219
Id. at 2312 (§ 1601(g)(13)).
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Id. at 2310–11 (§ 1601(g)(3)–(5)).
221
Id. at 2311 (§ 1601(g)(7)).
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Id. at 2306, 2308 § (1602(a), (e)).
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C. Obama Administration’s Proposed Financial Crisis Responsibility
Fee
On January 14, 2010, President Obama proposed a “Financial Crisis
Responsibility Fee” on large financial firms. 225 The tax rate would have been
0.15% and imposed on the liabilities, other than deposits, of the firms. 226 The
stated goal of the reform was restitution of TARP payouts tinged with
retribution over large executive bonuses. 227 According to the President, “My
commitment is to recover every single dime the American people are owed.
And my determination to achieve this goal is only heightened when I see
reports of massive profits and obscene bonuses at the very firms who owe their
continued existence to the American people.” 228
The fee would remain in place for ten to twelve years and collect enough
funds to cover the government’s outlays in the TARP program. 229 Presumably,
the tax would end once the government recouped its TARP outlays. When
originally proposed, the expected costs of TARP were $117 billion. 230 When
President Obama reproposed the fee a year later in February 2011, the
expected costs had fallen to $48 billion, 231 and in December 2011 they stood
at $34 billion. 232
The fee would apply to financial firms with more than $50 billion in
consolidated assets. Firms that received no direct TARP assistance would still
pay, under the theory that they indirectly benefited from TARP. 233 The fee
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would be 15 basis points (0.15%) of the firms “covered liabilities,” defined as
(1) total assets reduced by (2) tier one capital and (3) FDIC insured deposits. 234
Because the fee expires when all TARP expenses have been restored, the
proposal is not a corrective tax. If made permanent, however, the fee could
arguably serve a regulatory purpose because it would be levied on firm
leverage. Tier one capital, in rough terms, is firm equity. More equity reduces
leverage and also the fee. Deposits are certainly a form of debt, but they are
already “taxed” by the FDIC insurance system. 235 The rate of the fee—15
basis points—roughly corresponds to IMF estimates of the value of
governmental support of “too big to fail entities.” 236
D. Analysis
Proponents of liability levies typically frame their goals in terms of
restitution (e.g., the Obama administration) or the financing of future bailouts
(e.g., the derailed Dodd-Frank fee). They do not appear to be focused on
regulating conduct. Liability levies do, however, raise the cost of debt
financing, or leverage. Highly leveraged firms are more likely to fail and
impose costs on the financial system and economy as a whole. Thus, the
liability levies have some plausible relation to systemic risk.
The liability levies, though, are the roughest of tools. The premier system
of regulating financial institutions, the Basel Accords, started more than
twenty years ago out of the recognition that bank leverage does not adequately
measure systemic risk. 237 Consider two banks. Both have $90 billion of
liabilities (including deposits) and $10 billion of equity. They must, of course,
both have $100 billion of assets. One bank invests in risky assets that have a
50% chance of falling by more than $10 billion this year. This bank, as a
result, has a 50% chance of become insolvent. The other bank invests in lowrisk assets that have only a 1% chance of falling by more than $10 billion,
producing only a 1% chance of becoming insolvent. The two banks present
radically different systemic risks, but they are subject to the same levy.
Similarly, the liability levies do not adequately address derivatives, which very
often have the economic payoffs of leveraged investments.238
Nor does it account for the stability of the firm’s debt financing. Shortterm, wholesale financing (like repo) is far more unstable during a crisis than
long-term debt. 239 Finally, it does nothing to address how connected the
institution is to the financial system. A hedge fund might make highly
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leveraged bets on publicly traded stock. If the fund fails, it may stress its
lenders but otherwise cause little distress in the markets.

VI. CONCLUSION
The theory of a regulatory tax on finance sounds promising. Systemic risk
is an externality, like carbon emissions or pollution. Systemic-risk “polluters”
(large banks, etc.) privately profit while imposing costs on everyone else.
Direct regulation may well limit the amount of systemic risk at individual firms
and in the economy as a whole. It cannot, however, effectively allocate the
ability to emit systemic risk among various firms.
A tax on systemic risk could theoretically accomplish this goal by placing
a marginal cost upon each unit of systemic risk. If subject to tax, systemic risk
becomes just like any other economic input (labor, capital, etc.). The market
then automatically allocates the input to the most efficient producer. Another
advantage of a systemic risk tax could be in political economy if tax collectors
are more resilient to agency capture than financial regulators. Finally, a
systemic-risk tax would produce public revenue, much needed in an era of
large budget deficits in the United States and Europe.
But a tax needs some reasonably ascertainable base subject to tax.
Environmental taxes can rely on a physical tax base (e.g., carbon emissions).
Defining the right base for a corrective tax on finance is far harder. To do so,
we must move beyond metaphors (systemic risk is a “shock”) and economic
abstractions (systemic risk is an externality). We must, instead, define some
accounting or transactional measure that operationalizes the metaphors and
abstractions. To date, policymakers and commentators have failed to do so.
Mainstream proposals tax three basic measures: financial transactions,
financial activities, or firm leverage. None of these measures, though, has a
strong conceptual relationship to systemic risk. More esoteric measures
proposed in the finance literature fail as well.
This is not the final word on financial sector taxes. Alternative
justifications (like simply raising revenue) exist. Moreover, the problems
identified in this Article are practical in nature. Future researchers may yet
arrive at a good, administrable measure of systemic risk. This Article does not
end any debate, but it will hopefully guide the discussion on taxing the
financial sector.

